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Report Title 
Corruption Prevention in Ontario Municipalities  
 
Question 
 ‘Are government actions sufficient to reduce and eventually eliminate corruption 
and preserve integrity within Ontario Municipalities?’ 
 
Abstract  
“Over the last decade, a vast amount of academic as well as policy-
support research has been conducted on integrity, transparency and 
accountability – and conversely – corruption in the public sector… A consensus 
has developed world-wide over the importance of reforming public sector 
institutions to strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability and to prevent 
and combat corruption.  Such reforms are crucial to protecting public resources, 
enhancing public sector performance, and strengthening the government’s role in 
orchestrating development and providing basic services.” (Ashour, 2004) 
The main objective of this paper is to determine if the government, both 
provincial and municipal, are doing enough to prevent and eventually eliminate 
corruption and maintain integrity at the municipal level.  The determination is 
particularly important as Canadians municipalities, should be ‘seen as neutral, 
non-partisan, effective and innovative institutions that serve the best interests of 
the government and the citizens…’ (Langford, 1987). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Throughout history political and government figures have used their 
position to profit from bribes and kickbacks.” (Gerassi, 1980)  “The use of political 
office for economic [and personal] gain is tempting…[and] powerful politicians 
have been implicated in corrupt practices…Individuals in important positions sell 
their power, influence and information…such as government employees taking 
kickbacks from contractors in return for awarding them contracts.” (McCormick, 
2010).  These statements certainly attest to Leslie Pal’s evaluation of the 
operations of government, when he stated that “there is already a pervasive 
mood of cynicism and distrust of government.  Bad news concerning government 
operations is easily… seen as evidence of corruption, incompetence and 
malfeasance.” (Pal, 2003).     
Doug Ford of the City of Toronto as he ran for election as councillor in the 
2010 municipal election said, “The system at City Hall is broken.  There is a 
culture of corruption down there and we’re going to put an end to it… If this was 
in the States, they’d be in front of a grand jury and they’d be in jail right now” 
(Jenkins, 2010)   This was a very strong statement and was supported by the 
Mayoral Candidate at the time Rob Ford when he said, “I wish I could tell you the 
stuff that happens behind closed doors.”  These statements sent an implicative 
message that corrupt activities continued at the City of Toronto.  
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“Over the last decade, a vast amount of academic as well as policy-
support research has been conducted on integrity, transparency and 
accountability – and conversely – corruption in the public sector… A consensus 
has developed world-wide over the importance of reforming public sector 
institutions to strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability and to prevent 
and combat corruption.  Such reforms are crucial to protecting public resources, 
enhancing public sector performance, and strengthening the government’s role in 
orchestrating development and providing basic services.” (Ashour, 2004) 
With the amendment of the Municipal Act, 2001 through the Municipal 
Statute Law Amendment Act, the Ontario government’s intention is primarily to 
promote transparency and accountability within municipal operations and its 
awareness among the public.   The public is now able to participate in ensuring 
accountability and transparency and is directed by the Public Complaints 
guidelines.   A pertinent question is, ‘How informed is the public about the public 
complaints guidelines?’ 
“Accountability is the degree to which local governments have to explain 
or justify what they have done or failed to do.  It can be seen as the validation of 
participation, to which [the public] can hold a local government responsible for its 
actions…In theory, transparency in local governance should mean less scope for 
corruption, in that dishonest behaviour would become more easily detectable, 
punished and discouraged in future” (Decentralization Team, World Bank, 2008)    
The team also  revealed that  there exists an association between transparency 
and corruption, wherein, an ‘increase in the level of transparency in local 
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governance was not necessarily accompanied by increased corruption’.  It was 
further noted that the ‘increase in the level of transparency did however lead to 
popular perceptions of greater public malfeasance, simply because citizens 
became more aware of what was going on, a pattern that  continues to repeat  
itself in many other locales.’ Ontario Canada is by no means excluded from this 
perception by the public, where the media plays an integral role in the increased 
awareness. 
 I have chosen to examine this issue of corruption prevention in Ontario 
municipalities in an attempt to determine if government is doing enough to 
prevent and eliminate corruption and maintain integrity within Ontario 
municipalities.  Some would argue that the answer is very clear, but I believe 
taking another look at the issue is worth a try.  I believe I am embarking on a very 
sensitive issue, but one that is real and exists. It is an issue where the municipal 
staff that are involved in the corrupt activity go unreported, ignored too often and 
is not easily talked about in public.   The issue of corruption and prevention is 
usually associated with third world and developing countries, where measures 
are continuously reviewed to ensure that the problem is addressed on an 
ongoing basis. The province of Ontario along with the municipalities needs to be 
reminded that despite being located within a developed country, corrupt activities 
takes place right in our ‘backyards’.  
My interpretation or view of corruption and its prevention in Ontario 
municipalities is analogous to our annual road repairs during the spring and 
summer.  This comparison is in direct reference to a recent sink hole that 
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developed in a major intersection in London Ontario, where the problem was 
confirmed to be caused by a leaking water main that was slowly eroding the 
earth below the road. The indicator that a serious problem was looming was a 
broken section of the road that had partially swallowed a motor vehicle.  
Corruption, is similar to that two-foot crack in the asphalt of a major intersection - 
(municipality) and over the years at spring time, the crack is filled or patched with 
new asphalt - (the corrective measures), without the workers - (legislators) really 
trying to identify the source – (corrupt activities) of the crack (corruption), rather 
than assuming that it is as a result of a long and cold winter (e.g. weak 
legislation).  The patching continues until after a night of continuous rain, a 
massive sink hole - (crisis) appears, taking the place of the previous crack in the 
major intersection (municipality).    My thoughts are very similar to how corruption 
prevention is handled in Ontario municipalities - Sort of muddling through, 
wherein the corrective and preventive measures appear to be arbitrarily created 
and implemented with the hopes that they will work or appear to work.   
 Government is a trust created for the benefit of the people.  Elected officials 
acknowledge that “members of the public expect elected officials to be guided by 
the highest ethical standards of behavior in decision making and conduct.” 
(Council, 2011) To ensure that the ‘trustees’ of government act in the benefit of 
the people, legislation was and continues to be enacted and amended to direct 
and guide the administration of municipal management.  The general objective is 
to enhance municipal performance, protect the public resources and strengthen 
the government’s ability in providing its services. However, despite the legislative 
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directives of the Municipal Act, 2001, giving municipalities the authority to appoint 
an integrity commissioner and to provide education, advice and a complaints 
investigation services, many Ontario municipalities to date have not adhered to 
all the requirements. Sourced from a research conducted by a cross 
departmental team from the Corporation of the City of Brampton, it was revealed 
that of the 445 Ontario municipalities, less than 10 have established Codes of 
Conduct and an Integrity Commissioner.” (Council, 2011) For the few 
municipalities that have adhered to some aspects of the legislation, some did so 
after encountering allegations of incidents of corruption, the most prominent 
municipalities being the City of Toronto and Mississauga.   It must be 
emphasized that corruption is not unique to any level of government and is 
usually carried out by a very small percentage of both hired and elected staff. It is 
never a good position for government to be in at any point in time.   
 Corruption prevention in Ontario municipalities is the responsibility of the 
province, municipality, staff, law enforcers and the citizens. It is a collective 
responsibility to ensure that municipalities are operated in a manner that does 
not involve or support corrupt activities and where integrity and trust are highly 
regarded. Kathleen Sebelius states that, “The essence of good government is 
trust”.  Louis D. Brandeis’ theory aptly endorses the statement by expressing that 
“Our government... teaches the whole people by its example.  If the government 
becomes the lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to 
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy”.  Therefore, how government is set 
up and managed is critical in how integrity is seen by both the public and staff.  
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Therefore, ongoing improvement and reform in the way local government works, 
is so important in maintaining trust.   
 The next question to examine is, ‘how does government address an issue 
and reform a system when there is little to no data to know where we are, where 
we are coming from so we can know where we want to be?’ How can Ontario 
municipalities argue whether or not corruption is out of control? Surveys provide 
a proficient way of measuring the level of corruption within municipalities.  A 
survey on municipal corruption would attempt to capture the amount and dates of 
occurrences, the types of occurrences, the position of the wrong doer, whether 
the wrongdoer was criminally charged or not, the identity of the municipality, 
whether the municipality has an appointed integrity commissioner and whether 
the municipality has corruption preventative measures in place.  In my attempts 
to acquire reliable data, I requested the information via email from Statistics 
Canada.  The email response from Statistics Canada informed me that data on 
the occurrences or incidents of corruption within municipalities were not collected 
by the organization. This lack of reliable or statistically significant data will have a 
negative impact on how justification will be ascertained regarding the number of 
incidents or allegation of incidents.  If the facts are not available to facilitate 
comparisons, to conduct analysis and eventually make recommendations for 
improvement in the prevention of corruption; how will the province know for sure 
if the legislations enacted is being effective and if they are positively impacting 
the occurrences by reducing them?  The non-availability of a reliable database of 
empirical data has also limited my ability to look at any possible trend of incidents 
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over the years; hence I will look at the City of Toronto Bellamy Report as a case 
study in an attempt to answer the questions.     
 While I am evaluating corruption and its prevention, I will also review the 
definition of corruption, what causes it, where it occurs, what it involves and its 
effects.  This is important as I believe not being informed of the facts can also be 
pointed out as a starting point for corrupt activities within municipalities.  That is, 
if a staff member is not aware that ordering stationery through the city purchasing 
department and taking it home for their personal business is a corrupt activity, 
then it will continue at the expense of the tax-paying public and could develop 
into something more destructive.   I will also look at the various laws enacted to 
address the corruption issue through their directives and promotion of 
transparency, accountability and integrity within municipal operations, and 
attempt to determine their effectiveness in getting the job done. 
 Government, through the reporting of allegations of corruption incidents is 
aware that corruption exists and that it is not unique to any particular level.   
Legislation is being enacted over time in an attempt to address the issue and 
creating more legislation is not necessarily the most effective way of making the 
situation better.  Rochefort and Cobb in their theoretical approach to problem 
solving, states it well, “Through the accumulation of information, a troubling social 
condition comes to light and is documented.  Next it is the job of public officials to 
assess that problem and its causes and to respond as efficiently as possible 
through such means as new legislative enactments. Attention continues until the 
distressing concern is alleviated.” (Pal, 2003)  But, is this really the intention of 
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the upper levels of government in response to the apparent rise in allegations of 
corruption at the municipal level? The information required to be able to make 
intelligent decisions on the issue is not readily available because it is not 
necessarily collected in a dedicated database.  The media reporting of corrupt 
incidents within municipalities provides a fair idea that corrupt incidents continue 
to occur.  The Federal government in a reactive approach enacted the Public 
Sector Disclosure Protection Act (PSDPA) in 2007, and updated the requirement 
for municipalities to adopt policies in the Municipal Act, 2001 through the 
Municipal Statute Law Amendment Act to assist in addressing the issue. I will 
discuss in more detail later in the paper, how these Acts attempt to assist in the 
prevention of corruption.  I will look at what has been done by the province since 
2007(the time of the enactment of the Acts), the City of Toronto and the public to 
see whether they are collectively ‘continuing the prevention course and ensuring 
the distressing concern is eliminated’? (Pal, 2003) 
 The main objective of this paper is to determine if the governments, 
both provincial and municipal, are doing enough to prevent and eventually 
eliminate corruption and maintain integrity at the municipal level.  The 
determination is particularly important as Canadians municipalities, should be 
‘seen as neutral, non-partisan, effective and innovative institutions that serve the 
best interests of the government and the citizens…’ (Langford, 1987). Being 
accountable, transparent and maintaining integrity within municipalities are major 
steps towards achieving these attributes.  The purpose of this evaluation is to 
provide an understanding of corruption prevention within municipalities and to 
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make known the reasons why preventative measures were put in place. It is 
hoped that this evaluation will be beneficial to all government staff and the 
general public, to increase their awareness and know how they can play an 
integral role in curbing corruption and maintaining integrity in municipal 
government.  
Due to this rise in the media reported incidents and allegations of incidents 
of corrupt activities at the municipal level, my challenge is to evaluate the findings 
of the current preventative measures and arrive at a conclusion to be able to 
answer the question.   This is to be achieved by examining the various 
legislations that promotes transparency and accountability and determine the 
effectiveness of the preventative measures that are in place to address the issue.   
I will use Rochefort and Cobb’s theoretical approach to problem solving in 
analysing the incidents and allegations of corruption that were publicly disclosed 
relating to the City of Toronto scandal.  While determining if enough is being 
done to eliminate corruption and maintain integrity, I will identify lessons to be 
learned, best practices and measures to prevent a recurrence of the incidents.  I 
also will suggest recommendations that should be seriously considered for 
implementation to effectively address corruption and maintain integrity at the 
municipal level of government. 
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THE CITY OF TORONTO – BELLAMY INQUIRY 
 
The City of Toronto is Canada's largest city, formed through the largest 
amalgamation in Canada’s history in 1998 and now home to a population of 
about 2.6 million people. With a budget larger than that of any other city in 
Canada and bigger than those of most provinces, by any measure, Toronto is a 
major economic and cultural engine for Ontario and Canada. Toronto's municipal 
government is dedicated to delivering customer service excellence, creating a 
transparent and accountable government and reducing the size and cost of 
government.   Their efforts have been acknowledged with awards for quality, 
innovation and efficiency in delivering public services. The City of Toronto 
continues to strengthen the City's accountability and transparency through their 
participation in performance measurement and reporting initiatives to identify 
where they are doing well and where they need to improve.’  With that 
introduction adapted from the City’s website, one would believe the province’s 
dream of the ultimate municipality existed.  On the contrary, the City of Toronto 
has been recovering from over a decade of scandal and allegations of corruption 
highlighted through the Bellamy Inquiry Report. The report can be viewed online 
at http://www.toronto.ca/inquiry/inquiry_site/report/index.html.  The report 
highlights the ‘worst practice’ examples in municipal procurement and clearly 
demonstrated the need for transparency, accountability and neutrality in 
decision-making at the municipal level.  The findings of Madam Justice Bellamy, 
the commissioner who conducted the two judicial inquiries:  the  Toronto 
Computer Leasing Inquiry and the Toronto External Contracts Inquiry, painted a 
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“searing picture of the city’s politicians, lobbyists and bureaucrats as wallowing in 
a swamp of greed...” (Toronto Star, 2009)  The findings noted in the report 
provides lessons in what should not be done as municipal staff and officials carry 
out the daily administration of the municipality.   
It may sound strange to say that the ‘scandal’ could not have happened to 
a better municipality, but looking at the positive side; it turned out to be a good 
learning experience for all Ontario municipalities.  The opportunity to improve 
how city services are delivered, how the limited resources are allocated and 
essentially how the municipal operations are carried out on a daily basis, was 
given precedence all because it took place at the City of Toronto.  Justice 
Bellamy commented  that other municipalities and other levels of government 
could benefit or find useful the recommendations provided and identify where 
their own organization could do things better.  She stated that the principles that 
emerged were applicable since government conducted essentially the same 
business throughout Ontario. (p. 23) 
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THE PROBLEM 
 
“Through the accumulation of information, a troubling…condition comes to 
light and is documented…” (Pal, 2003) 
 
Noticed by one of the Toronto’s Councillors in a staff report were the few 
words, ‘current technology lease provider’, it sparked his curiosity and he wanted 
answers.  He wanted answers because he was always concerned that “buried in 
reports were one-line statements that would come back to lynch you...” (pp. 33-
34).  MFP Financial Services was identified as the ‘current technology lease 
provider, and when questions arose in the media about MFP leases with the City 
of Waterloo, the City of Toronto realized they too needed to conduct an 
investigation.  The City then requested a KPMG investigation on the MFP leases. 
In June 2001, it was revealed through the investigation, that the 1999 council 
approved $43 million lease with MFP had grown to more than $80 million.  This 
raised further red flags that brought to light the troubling conditions of influence, 
incompetence, ambition, greed, secrets and lies that had taken place at the City 
of Toronto. So what were these troubling conditions and why was the situation 
concluded as such? 
Wanda Liczyk, who will now refer to as WL, was the Treasurer and a key 
decision-maker at the City of Toronto.  Over a number of years, WL had 
developed an intimate relationship Michael Saunders, who we will refer to as MS, 
a representative of American Management Systems, a Virginia based company.  
WL at no time over the years disclosed that she had intimate relations with MS.  
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WL was one of the three decision-makers on MS first business proposal, where 
he won the contract through the tender process.    In another business proposal 
MS along with another American IT consultant proposed a customized tax 
management and collection system called TMACS.   WL being one of the 
decision-makers and not surprisingly the contract was awarded to MS again.  
What made the award of this contract more questionable was the fact that the 
contract was not tendered.  
The actions of WL by not declaring her relationship with MS, being present as 
a decision maker at all awards and not tendering one of the contract, went 
against the North York Code of Conducts of that time.  The code stated that an 
employee “never uses the position to secure an advantage or favours for self, 
family of friends”    Justice Bellamy in her report stated that “WL clearly knew that 
boundaries existed, even if she did not quite get where the  line should be 
drawn.. She walked into conflicts of interest with her eyes wide open.”   Not only 
was WL in breach of that code she was blatantly and repeatedly engaging in 
what some would consider being corrupt activities.  Corruption, as defined by the 
World Bank and Transparency International is “the misuse of public office for 
private gain.” ( The World Bank, 1997)  “This includes a public servant accepting, 
soliciting or extorting a bribe as well as instances where no bribery occurs but 
public office is still misused, such as through nepotism, patronage, theft of assets 
and diversion of state revenue.” (The World Bank, 2008)    Added to this 
definition, is a precondition for corruption, know as Conflict of Interest.  This 
occurs when a “public sector employee or official is being influenced by personal 
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considerations… [she/he then] make decisions for the wrong reasons that result 
in wrong consequences” (Ethics B.O. Transparency International, 2000). It is 
without a doubt that WL actions fittingly fell within the definitions.  
This conflict of interest continued and was identified through the ‘targeted 
marketing’ strategies of MFP towards the influential individuals at the City of 
Toronto.  Irene Payne, the senior Vice President of Sales and Marketing of MFP 
labelled Dash Domi as a ‘hunter’ and recruited him as the new sales 
representative for MFP.  IP’s objective was for DD to target WL and her staff by 
providing incentives to keep the decisions in favour of MFP.  Although not 
experienced in the leasing business, and a former hairdresser, DD displayed the 
qualities that IP desired and also used his brother’s fame as influence.   He 
managed to use his influence by offering ‘goods’ to WL in an attempt to gain her 
favour as a key decision maker.  DD broke through to WL by inviting her along 
with Jim Andrew, WL’s staff, to a dinner dance to ‘rub shoulders’ with other sport 
celebrities.     Over time WL accepted meals, hockey tickets and golf passes and 
a trip by air on a chartered jet to Ottawa to watch a hockey game.   Once again 
WL had fallen in to a similar trap that she had fallen in with MS.     Gifts were also 
offered to JA and included trips to the Masters Golf tournament in Georgia, 
meeting in England, lunches, dinners and so on.  The Bellamy report stated that 
‘JA accepting all his gifts was an obvious and troubling sign that he as a public 
servant was for sale.’ What made the situation more troubling was that JA tried to 
justify the acceptance of the gifts as an “opportunity to learn about the supplier’s 
product”.    
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The general theory is that ‘corrupt staff lack self control and follow their 
impulses without considering the consequences.” (Siegel, 2010)  There are also 
some staffs who possess a high degree of self control but due to the aggressive 
need to satisfy their ego, they get involved with corrupt activities.  In between the 
staffs with low and high self control, there are some staff who get involved in 
corrupt activities because the opportunity presents itself at a time of need.  It is 
clear that some hired staff and elected officials including WL and JA, who engage 
in corrupt practices “convince themselves that their actions are not criminal 
because the acts do not resemble street crimes” (Siegel, 2010). 
It is also evident that the position that staff members holds, can also cause 
them to disregard policies, regulations and legislations.  WL using her position as 
the city treasurer to award a contract without it being tendered was a blatant 
disregard of City policies regarding tenders.  One would question why some 
individuals in a position of trust, despite rules and regulations, still involve 
themselves in corrupt activities. Is it a matter of greed, need or corporate culture?   
A PricewaterhouseCoopers 2003 survey (Fraud and corruption in Local 
Government, 2008)  (See Appendix 1) revealed that the primary motivation for 
staff to get involved in corrupt activities is Greed.  Greed that takes the form of; 
some staff feeling there is a need to improve their jobs, satisfy their ego or to 
reduce their emotional and financial insecurity.   
WL and JA were two staff members, described by Justice Bellamy as 
“individuals who lacked professionalism, ignored obvious conflicts of interest, 
showed prodigious appetite for corporate freebies, and were incompetent and 
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persistent liars.  They were almost pathetically vulnerable to sales tactics in the 
guise of entertainment and favours.”    WL and JA, in their position as decision 
makers, had walked head first into corrupt activities and based on their actions 
must have reasoned that what they were doing was not criminal.   So powerful 
was WL, (a passionate advocate for TMACS or was it MS?) that she was able to 
overturn the evaluator’s decisions to approve the new tax system as TXM 2000. 
WL would continue to do whatever it took to extend the favours to TMACS.  It did 
not end there - ‘WL extended MS work proposals and placed him in charge of 
implementing the proposed tax system TXM, likely to ensure its failure; she split 
the contracts in two to give the impression that she was keeping within her 
budget; she exceeded her signing limits for one of MS contracts and was a key 
player in the TMACS victory’.   “Bob Ripley’s memo to Giuliana Carbone said that 
TXM was ‘a poor second choice’ compared with TMACS. When he wrote those 
words, he didn’t believe them. He had surrendered. The events of the past year 
had made it plain to him that WL would not be denied what she wanted, and she 
clearly wanted TMACS”. (p. 80)  Added to WL wrongdoing, she also bribed 
another senior manager by dangling the promise of a promotion in return for his 
loyalty to TMACS.  It was obvious that WL had taken her position, influence and 
authority to another level.  She was now involved in bribery, ‘which is the offering 
of money, good or services in order to gain an unfair advantage.’  Her action was 
used in an attempt to sway the senior manager’s opinion, action or decision.  She 
also abused or took advantage of her power, wherein she as the City Treasurer 
used her authority to benefit dishonestly; That is, she extended favour towards 
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MS in all the contracts including the TMACS tax system.  With the continued 
abuse of WL powers, she could also be said to be implicated in the act of 
Patronage.  This occurs ‘with the granting of favours, contracts or appointments 
by a municipal staff in return for some form of support.’ Some politicians and 
executives at the local level, by virtue of their position, are able to exercise their 
influence and authority to control the key decision making process.  “Dell bided 
on a huge computer acquisition tendered by the City of Toronto but was knocked 
out of the running. However, the company came back—seemingly from 
nowhere—and won a big contract.  Dell went on to provide the City of Toronto 
millions of dollars’ worth of top-quality computers and excellent service, at a great 
price. There was only one problem. Companies eliminated from competitive 
tender processes are supposed to stay eliminated, not win contracts. When the 
seemingly impossible happens, there may be invisible hands at work 
somewhere… How was it transformed from out-of-the-running bidder to major 
supplier?”  (p. 117) The invisible hands appeared to have taken the form of JA 
advising Dell to hire Jeff Lyons as their lobbyist, (who was also the lobbyist for 
MFP) after which their favour with the city was noticeably improved. (p. 126).  
This makes it clearer to determine that the ability to control decision making is 
closely tied into ‘power’.    
 
 It is evident that from the associations that existed between WL, MS, JA, JL 
and DD, that ‘corrupt activities occurs within human interactions for various 
reasons and is not necessarily controlled by rules, regulations or policies.’ This 
attests to Weber’s theory that “bureaucrats will develop interests of their own and 
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start to shape policy, increasing the attendant danger that the rule of law will be 
undermined…” (Raadschelders, 2008) 
In the three months that DD had been placed on the City’s account, he had 
submitted nearly $20,000.00 in entertainment expense receipts to MFP related to 
City staff.  DD receipts were questionable, because there were times when there 
was no name or another MFP staff would have arbitrarily wrote a name in, 
nonetheless his expenses were never questioned by his superiors.  This manner 
of business strategy was encouraged by DD’s superiors to ensure that MFP 
continued to be in good standing with the City of Toronto.   Was the fact that 
MFP always received the favour of the decision makers another unrecognized 
sign of a weak system?   There was an obvious breakdown in communication 
between IT, purchasing and Council, regarding the sale and lease back sale 
program.  This involved the City purchasing computers from Dell and then sold 
the computers to MFP and leased them back from MFP. It was agreed that if 
each party knew what was being done, the arrangements would have been 
handled in a more accountable and transparent manner. That is, purchasing 
would have approached the transaction differently through the required 
competitive process if they knew exactly what the bid was for and it would have 
required Council approval. (pp. 219-220)  How could this lack of accountability 
and transparency go unnoticed?  The occurrence of these acts may have been 
possible, as some elected officials and hired staff tends to get involved in corrupt 
activities because a particular system that was put in place is not working as 
planned.  A weak system in place is more likely to present opportunities for 
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municipal employees to get involved in corrupt activities, especially if they believe 
there is little to no chance that they will be caught.  In other words, corrupt 
activities are to be expected where there is ‘lack of accountability and 
transparency’ and ‘weak enforcement’.    
It was alleged that Tom Jakobek, the Budget Chair and a veteran City 
Councillor, accepted an all expense trip from DD to watch hockey in Philadelphia 
and for what reasons?  Would the acceptance of this gift have an effect on his 
judgment in any future decisions relating to MFP? TJ and Jeff Lyons, the lobbyist 
for both MFP and Dell Financial Services had known each other for over twenty 
years. TJ showed interest in the tender process that involved both MFP and Dell 
by requesting to see the draft RFQ.  This revealed the fact that he had interest in 
knowing where MFP stood in the tender process. JA later viewed forwarding the 
information to TJ as an error of judgment.  It was also alleged that JL announced 
to DFS staff that “Tom, says it’s (the contract success) worth one hundred and 
fifty grand”.  Apparently JL wanted a ‘success fee’.  He was taking advantage of 
Dell’s precarious position to enrich himself, which suggested that another 
troubling situation was in progress.  Another allegation of corrupt activity was 
said to have occurred between DD & TJ.  It is alleged that DD withdrew funds, 
made phone calls to and later met TJ in the parking garage of City Hall in a 
matter of hours. Over the next two days large questionable deposits were made 
to accounts of TJ and family.  It is unclear what exactly took place between the 
two, but due to what had been occurring at the City, there was much speculation. 
(pp. 349-350)  But why would DD and TJ be involved in such an alleged 
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transaction? “Councillor Jakobek’s motion at the Policy and Finance Committee 
gave MFP great flexibility to enhance its deal with the City” (p. 374)  and that was 
DD’s job as the hunter to constantly ‘target his prey’.  Justice Bellamy stated that 
“Dash Domi and Tom Jakobek were given every opportunity to refute the theory 
that a sales representative had made an improper payment to a City Councillor.  
Their stories were inconsistent and implausible and they both seemed to forget 
many critical details when it best suited their strategic purposes.  The only thing 
that was consistent was their lies”.  (p. 375)  Justice Bellamy also agreed that 
there was enough credible evidence to reach a conclusion that there was a 
payoff and no available proof to disprove the allegation. (p. 376) 
 Some hired staff and elected officials get involved in corrupt activities 
because their municipalities operations may appear to promote corrupt activities, 
known as ‘systemic corruption’.  This corrupt activity takes the form of passing on 
the culture to the new employees, who over time adopt the corrupt activity.  It is 
passed on at the executive level or by seasoned staff (directly or indirectly) 
informing the newer staff that certain behaviours are acceptable and reinforcing 
that, ‘that is how it is done here.’  Could this be the reason why MFP was usually 
successful in winning their contracts with WL as one of the decision makers? 
How could WL not notice the inaccuracies, such as photocopiers being included 
with computers and referred to as peripherals in the submitted council reports 
and including that fact that one awarded contract was not tendered?  Is it likely 
that it occurred because the other senior staff member who signed the report was 
new and not yet familiar with the City process? (pp. 38-39, 218).  “Kathryn Bulko 
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followed the lead set by her superiors. She accepted invitations to corporate 
boxes and vendor lunches. She played golf on corporate tabs and enjoyed 
corporate hospitality suites. Echoing JA’s excuse, she said she saw this as part 
of her job: ‘building relationships and networking’… she wasn’t aware there was 
a code of conduct that governed her behavior” (p. 163) 
 When Councillor Balkissoon and the rest of council questions relating to the 
multimillion dollar leases was made know to the public by John Barber in the 
Globe and Mail, JL along with DD   attacked Councillor B accusing him of 
seeking media attention.  But was he really seeking media attention or was he 
doing his job; seeking the best interest of the taxpayers and how their tax dollars 
is been spent?  Why would a lobbyist and a sales representative of MFP believe 
that it was their duty to ‘attack’ a councillor as he carried out his duty? Is it likely 
that they were made to believe that maintaining a ‘marketing relationship’ with 
certain senior staff was acceptable and should not have been questioned by 
anyone including councillors?   It is further believed that some municipalities 
“contain a ‘subculture’ that resists legislation and regulation, and socializes new 
employees in the skills and attitudes necessary to violate the law...” (Siegel, 
2010).   Is this likely what was taking ‘flight’ within the City of Toronto 
procurement process? On the contrary, Hirschi and Gottfredson argue that 
‘corrupt activities by executives and staff are not a product of corporate culture 
and that if it was so, there would be more corruption and the offenders would not 
be offended when found out.’ (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1987)  This view remain 
arguable and will be revisited when I attempt to determine if the ‘distressing 
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concerns’ have been lessened.  Hirschi and Gottfredson further believe that ‘the 
motives for corrupt activities are similar to the motives that lead to persons 
committing other street crimes. That is, ‘the desire for quick and certain self 
benefits with little effort…’  
In short, the causes of the incidents and allegations of corruption that 
occurred at the City of Toronto over time were largely as a result of bad 
governance, lack of political goodwill, weak laws, lack of professional integrity 
and lack of transparency and accountability.  All the individuals involved (the 
municipal staff, elected officials and the suppliers), their thoughts and the weak 
system became corrupted and all these activities occurred within a process.  
That is, the low values, wrong decisions, evil desires and wicked schemes, all led 
to poor procedures, weak systems, bad conduct and inadequate regulations. 
 “Corruption also misdirects resources, an economic cost... It destroys the 
confidence of people in their government and undermines the very legitimacy of 
the political institution, the political costs.”  (Sampford & Preston, 2006).  
“Corruption is a direct impediment to development as it hurts the many and 
benefits the few.  It inhibits the government’s ability to respond to citizens needs 
and to utilize the scarce resources in the most efficient and effective manner.” 
(Ongwenyi, 2008) This could be said of the activities of the elected officials and 
senior staff of the City of Toronto who did not protect the interest of the City and 
its citizens, when they failed to be trustees in ensuring that the tax dollars were 
spent as efficiently as it could.  They were in fact benefiting the few, themselves, 
and hurting the many, the citizens of Toronto.      
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THE MEASURES 
 
“…Next it is the job of the public officials to assess the problem and its 
causes and to respond as efficiently as possible through such means as 
new legislative enactments…” (Pal, 2003) 
 
Subsection 100 (2) of the Municipal Act “gives municipalities the authority 
to establish a judicial inquiry to investigate ‘any matter connected with the good 
government of the municipality or the conduct of any part of its public business’ 
and any related alleged misconduct.” This is a remarkable legislative tool in 
terms of its objective in helping to address the incidents of corrupt activities, but 
how many other municipalities take advantage of this tool when faced with 
allegations? The City of Toronto took advantage of the authority given and 
established an inquiry which was called the Toronto Computer leasing Inquiry or 
‘TCLI’. However, the City Council eventually voted to broaden the coverage of 
the inquiry to investigate and report on other contracts entered into by the City.  
This second inquiry became known as the Toronto External Contracts Inquiry or 
‘TECI’.  
 Along with the provision of section 100(2) of the Municipal Act, 
municipalities also have the power to ‘demand’ the services of a judge of the 
Superior Court and so Justice Bellamy was appointed to carry out a public inquiry 
into the allegations.  (p. 21)  One may question why a public inquiry?  As explain 
by Justice Bellamy, “public inquiries (carried out in the eyes of the public) are 
often convened in the wake of public shock, horror, disillusionment, or suspicion. 
They are expected to uncover ‘the truth’.  Inquiries are investigations, and in that 
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sense they are informative and educational. They are also preventive, in that 
they seek to ensure that any mistakes uncovered will not be repeated. Inquiries 
also serve a purpose that is less obvious, but just as important they are 
restorative.”  (p. 20)  This was another way to indicate to the tax paying public 
that government was accountable and wanted to be transparent in how the issue 
was handled, but most of all to show that they wanted to correct the problem and 
prevent it from recurring. 
As a part of the inquiry, Toronto City Council requested a comprehensive 
review of the purchasing process within the city, one of the likely municipal 
departments in which corrupt activities can occur.  The objective was to assess 
the procurement function to determine if the many procedures and policies that 
were already in place were impartial, transparent and cost-effective.    It was 
hoped that through the review, which included consulting with staff, conducting 
surveys and reviewing documents and records, that the key successful factors 
relating to the procurement process along with the problems and would be 
highlighted and opportunities to improve them be identified.  It took more than 
three years to examine in minute detail the occurrences that had taken place at 
City Hall.  There were hearings from 156 witnesses which included members of 
the media, Ontario MPP’s academics, private sector procurement experts, 
lobbyist, federal ethics counsellor and citizen’s advocacy groups, all in an attempt 
to assess the problem and its causes to facilitate an effective solution. (p. 90 & 
93) 
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It was clear that the City of Toronto wanted to do whatever it took to 
evaluate the source of the problem, so before the public inquiry was established, 
the services of a professional audit firm was retained to conduct an investigation.  
The audit firm also concluded that a public inquiry was necessary and willing 
assisted the inquiry by providing documents and notes where necessary.  
Through the inquiry investigators were also hired to locate witnesses and 
documents by conducting preliminary interviews.  Also playing an important role 
in the inquiry was experts who provided their professional knowledge and opinion 
to facilitate a better understanding of what was taking place, why it was 
happening and to suggest recommendations to prevent a recurrence. 
The review and inquiry team established that there was a lack of clarity 
with respect to roles and responsibilities within the procurement process. This 
contributed to the unnecessary delays in the procurement of goods and services 
and frustration among staff.  Also highlighted was the fact that staff within the 
department needed additional training.  Training that would address the existing 
questionable conditions such as ensuring integrity and compliance with policies 
within the evaluation and decision making process.   It was brought to light that 
some senior staff and councillors were unaware that codes were in place to 
guide their behaviours and exposed the fact that the codes of conduct were not 
effectively communicated.  The team also identified that the purchasing and 
financial control bylaws and guidelines were not focused on operational decisions 
in providing useful materials and guidance to staff and the appropriate controls 
were not in place to minimize the risks and detect non-compliance within the 
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process.    A review of the City policy with regards to external consultants also 
revealed that there were no provisions to disallow them from participating in the 
internal preparations of request documents.  (pp. 965-969)  The investigation 
along with the evidence provided, highlighted the problem policy areas as 
conflicts and ethics, lobbying, procurement and municipal governance.  In 
respect to governance, Justice Bellamy gave her opinion that “Toronto City 
Council meetings often resemble barely controlled chaos. An uncharitable 
observer might even say they border on the chronically dysfunctional. [She] 
observed that the root causes [were] interrelated and could not be ranked in any 
definitive order of importance.  (pp. 14-15) 
During the hearings, Justice Bellamy encouraged the City to continue with 
the necessary changes and to not simply await her recommendations. She was 
pleased to see that the City did indeed begin implementing improvements, and 
for her it meant that they had made an important headway. (p. 409)  The City had 
attempted to clarify the roles, responsibilities, authorities and accountability of the 
PMM Division and the procurement process; they implemented new training 
programs; improved management controls; improved guidelines for 
communication with vendors and developed a checklist for the tender process.” 
(p. 412)  One of the corrective measures recommended before the inquiry was 
conducted, was from the Audit Committee. It requested that the Auditor General 
submit an annual report on the status of fraud and any related matter that 
occurred within the City of Toronto.  This was to be accomplished through the 
information gathered from the Fraud and Waste hotline which was initiated in 
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2002 and its operation became the responsibility of the Auditor General office.  
The hotline facilitated whistle blowing another tool used to address corruption, 
and it importance was highlighted through training of staff.   
It was a matter of necessity that the inquiry be completed, because likely 
resulting from the continued acts of corruption are ineffective controls, 
unnecessary delays in processing, complicated procedures, and lack of 
transparency and accountability.  These corrupt activities at the City of Toronto, if 
left unattended, were likely to lead to blatant disregard for standards and 
integrity, inadequate audit and rampant oversights, some of which were already 
unfolding as highlighted in Volume 1 – Facts and Findings of the Bellamy Report. 
Having highlighted the problems and their causes, the next step is identifying the 
preventative measures that were recommended and implemented in response to 
the troubling condition or problem and their impact? 
It is said that, “Law and court decisions affect all aspects of 
the…management process…Managers [and all staff members] must comply with 
governmental regulations to promote an environment free from litigation.” 
(Stewart, Belcourt, Bohlander, & Snell, HRM, 2011) This applies to all 
organizations within society, with no exception for municipal management.  
Justice Bellamy knew that there had to be effective measures to motivate 
municipal staff and elected officials to conform to the rules in place and so 
provided some 241 recommendations which were mostly directed towards the 
procurement and tendering process and to Toronto City Council.  This is not 
surprising when we look back at the cause of the alleged corrupt activities and 
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the persons involved.   In the remaining part of this paper I will try to capture the 
recommendations that best assist in answering the question of whether enough 
is being done to eliminate corruption and maintain integrity within Ontario 
municipalities. 
The City of Toronto had been in the negative light of the public and media for 
too long and their integrity was on the line.  They needed to ‘step up’ their 
corrective measures and prepare themselves to consider and implement the 
recommendations.  In her recommendations, Justice Bellamy encouraged the 
City and provincial officials to work together on any enabling legislation that 
would be necessary to implement any of the recommendations” to address and 
keep the danger of corrupt activities in check.   (p. 139)   In keeping with the 
recommendations, one of the key amendments in the Municipal Act, 2001 was 
the addition of Part V.1 – Accountability and Transparency, which is intended to 
provide municipalities with greater accountability powers.  Municipalities are 
given authority to create codes of conduct for hired staff and elected officials and 
to put in place other measures such as the employment of an Integrity 
Commissioner to ensure that corrupt activities are discouraged and integrity 
maintained.  This integrity commissioner would be a ‘watchdog’, overseeing the 
performance of the elected officials and hired staff and “responsible for providing 
advice, complaint resolution and education to members of City Council and 
members of the local boards on the application of the City’s Code of Conduct and 
other by-laws, policies and legislation governing ethical behavior.” (The City of 
Toronto, 2009)  The City needed to empower leadership that could outline and 
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implement ‘visionary’ policy while continuing to be accountable.  Part V.1 also 
lists the unregulated authorities relating to the appointment of accountability 
officers. These officers include: An Integrity Commissioner, Ombudsman, Auditor 
General and a Lobbyist Registrar.  It should be noted that only The New City of 
Toronto Act mandates the appointment of all four offices with the City of Toronto.  
All other municipalities can make their own decision about the establishment of 
such. Is it prudent to suggest that this mandate to appoint all four offices be 
reconsidered and expected of all Ontario municipalities?   
Already in place was the Criminal Code and the Conflicts of Interest Act. 
Sections 122 & 331-336 of the Criminal Code [R.S., c.C-34, S.1.] address corrupt 
activities that can take place in municipal government operations.  Section 122 
specifically targets every public official who, in connection with the duties of his or 
her office, commits fraud or a breach of trust. It speaks to staff actions that lead 
to corruption such as theft, extortion, breach of trust, forgery and fraud.  The 
Municipal Conflicts of Interest Act R.S.O., 1990 c. M.50, presents rules regarding 
conflicts of interest and enforces the rule via the Courts. The Act main purpose is 
to prevent “public officials from benefiting financially from a decision in which they 
are decision-makers. If a public official has a possible conflict of interest, they 
must declare it, refrain from debating, voting on or in any way influencing the 
decision and, if the meeting is closed to the public, they must leave the meeting 
until the matter is no longer under consideration.”    
To be able to fully determine if these laws are being effective or not, we need 
to justify the purpose of government enacting legislation. There is justification in 
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government enacting legislation, as “Government is a trust and the officers of the 
government are trustees.  Both the trust and the trustees are created for the 
benefit of the people.” (Henry Clay).  Laws were enacted with a special purpose 
in mind, which is to promote transparency and accountability, to discourage 
corruption and at the same time maintain integrity within government. Legislation 
in general provides direction for staff and elected officials, to encourage them to 
avoid in engaging in corrupt activities, such as giving or receiving of a bribe, and 
falsifying a claim; to appreciate and reward hard work, honesty and 
trustworthiness; to report cases of corruption to the relevant authorities; to 
identify and eliminate situations that promote corruption and to suggest ways of 
sealing loopholes that promote corruption and allows it to remain unreported or 
unnoticed.  In addition to providing directives for staff, it also encourages the 
public to respect and protect public property and to name and shame corrupt 
people.  
Therefore, with these laws already in place, how could the activities have 
played out at the City of Toronto without anyone recognizing they were engaging 
in activities that were against the law?  Richard and Susan Tindal in their 2007 
article, ‘Keys to good governance’, stated that “if individuals within an 
organization lacks the basic standards of moral and ethical behaviour, they will 
devote their energies to finding ways around whatever new rules are put in 
place.” (Tindal, 2007) This statement certainly poses a challenge to legislation 
along with other preventative measures.  However, this is where Justice 
Bellamy’s recommendation that the City appoints a full-time integrity or ethics 
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commissioner could make the difference.  The integrity commissioner would 
have investigative powers by requiring staff and councillors to co-operate with the 
office of the integrity commissioner (rec. #43, 45), have an educational role with 
respect to ethics and also an advisory role for councillors and staff (rec. #36 to 
40, 49, 50)  
The Ontario government having enacted legislation to direct municipal 
operations in an attempt to reduce the allegations and occurrences of corruption 
is realizing that something remains unresolved, as the reporting of incidents both 
in the media and in the annual Auditor General’s report continue.  Is it that the 
laws are not effectively implemented? Is it that the prosecution for the crimes 
committed is not persuasive enough? Or is there too much leniency within the 
law through the judges and prosecutors for hired municipal staff and elected 
officials when there is an allegation of their involvement in corruption?  So what 
else is needed and listed as a recommendation to curb or address the incidents 
and allegations of corruption within local government and at the same time 
maintain integrity? 
With respects to codes of conduct, some of the recommendations by 
Justice Bellamy suggested that the current codes of conduct be expanded for 
councillors and conflicts of interest policy for staff to include ethical 
considerations (rec. #1), and should reflect the difference in roles between 
councillors and staff without setting different ethical standards (rec. #4).  Codes 
of conduct were also suggested for lobbyists (in an attempt to control or monitor 
lobbying) where the City of Toronto was advised to set mandatory minimum 
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standards for them as they conduct business with the City (rec. #98 to 104). 
Justice Bellamy made it clear ‘that lobbying in itself was not inappropriate, but 
served to provide public officials with useful information on goods and services’ 
(p. 411) In response to some of the activities that took place at the City of 
Toronto, Greg Levine states that “offering a bribe is not lobbying, it is well beyond 
it, it is corruption” (Levine, 2006) These recommendations were therefore 
necessary to be used in addition to laws, as developing and implementing codes 
of conduct and ethical standards was an additional step needed to assist with the 
issue of corruption.  Codes of conduct are crucial in protecting the employees 
and the reputation of local government and are so designed to foresee and avert 
unacceptable and corrupt behavior within municipal operations.  Codes often 
capture a ‘vision of excellence’ and a guides employee along the preferred path 
to achieve professionalism and the organization’s desired goals or objectives.  
Codes are considered to be the “ultimate term of reference and the framework 
upon which professions are built.”  (Manyasi, 2008)    It is hoped that these codes 
will keep staff and officials focused on doing what is right and for the right 
reasons, and in so doing increase the likelihood that they will behave in an 
acceptable manner on a consistent basis.   
During the inquiry Justice Bellamy noted that the 2003 municipal elections 
had passed and all of the major mayoral candidates in that election talked about 
ethics, integrity, and restoring public trust. She went on to say that,  ‘In 2003, 
questions of ethics and integrity were given the prominence they needed, if the 
residents of the City of Toronto are to have an accountable, transparent 
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municipal government with integrity, one they deserve.’(p. 409)  Ken Otieno 
Obura in a report to the USAID on anti-corruption and ethics, asserted that, 
“promoting ethics and integrity in the fight to curb corruption is important as it is 
the key to maintaining trust and determines the core values of a community”. 
(Obura, 2008)  Because ethics guidelines are extrinsic and integrity guidelines 
are intrinsic, the success of the two in curbing corruption depends on the 
personal commitment from individuals that make up the municipal staff.    Ethical 
behaviours by municipal staff are displayed through the respect, fairness, 
trustworthiness, accountability, self restraint and responsibility that are conveyed 
during the administration of public resources. Integrity on the other hand, is an 
‘internal system of principle’ which guides our behavior.  That is, it is a choice 
rather than an obligation, it cannot be forced by outside sources and it conveys a 
sense of wholeness. Integrity involves the ability to discern right from wrong and 
the commitment to do what is right all the time.  Personal integrity also lays the 
foundation for professional and institutional integrity. That is, staff will remain 
committed to the goals and standards of their professions no matter the 
circumstances.   
The HRM functions which is “getting the most from employees for [the] 
organizational success and providing a work environment that meets the 
employee’…needs” (Stewart, Belcourt, Bohlander, & Snell, 2011)  show that it 
was designed to improve organizations performance and in so doing, is likely to 
impede corruption. That is, it is in place to recruit the most competent staff 
already with proper work ethics, promote positive relations between staff, provide 
P a g e  | 38 
 
the resources that are required for staff to work efficiently and effectively 
including a positive and safe environment, ensure that practices and procedures 
for municipal operation are in place to create a sense of accountability and 
transparency, identify areas of weakness within the municipal operations and 
design and impart knowledge through training programs to the elected officials 
and  line managers so that it can be passed on to staff.   The focus of HRM is to 
then emphasize the values that should be regarded, as staff carry out the daily 
administration of the municipality.  Since HRM is designed to effectively develop 
it employees, it is equally important that it be incorporated within the municipal 
corporate strategy to ensure the municipal goals are met through its staff.  
(ASHOUR, 2004)  
It is now more understandable why Justice Bellamy made 
recommendations that involved having the HRM function assist in addressing the 
problem.  Some of these recommendations were: that appropriate ethical 
question be designed for use in interviews to assist in the hiring of the applicants 
(rec. # 6) and that those new employees would receive immediate training on 
ethics (rec. # 7).  For all city staff and councillors, she suggested mandatory 
training on codes of conduct (rec. # 8) and all should be required to sign an 
annual declaration that they are aware of the codes of conduct, are versed in 
them and will uphold them (rec. # 10).  In addition, Justice Bellamy 
recommended  that all the city codes of conduct be monitored to ensure that they 
continue to provide appropriate guidance, and that the awareness of the codes 
are promoted on an ongoing basis (rec. # 13, 14).  Other recommendations that 
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could be effectively implemented and carried out through the HRM function are 
‘Relations between Councillors and staff’ (rec. # 15 to 19), ‘Conflicts of Interest 
and Apparent conflicts of interest’ (rec. # 20 to 29), ‘Education and outreach’ (rec. 
# 49, 50) and general training of staff (rec. # 136 to 145).  It was noted that the 
City of Toronto amended its existing conflicts of interest policy that required staff 
to report and document all situations and in addition they were required to sign a 
declaration indicating that they have read and understood the conflict of interest 
policy. 
Social accountability is a process that builds accountability and relies on 
civic engagement, in which citizens and organizations can participate directly or 
indirectly in raising and maintaining accountability. Social accountability includes 
“citizen participation in public policy making, participatory budgeting, public 
expenditure tracking, citizen monitoring of public service delivery, citizen advisory 
boards, and lobbying and advocacy campaigns.”  (World Bank Group, 2011)  
Justice Bellamy mentioned that an option to getting community councils involved 
with the decision making is engaging them to act purely as a consultative body 
on strategy and policy matters and also as final decision makers on issues of a 
local nature, such as traffic issues. This is certainly engaging citizens but is it at 
the level wherein they can assist in the prevention of corrupt activities?  Justice 
Bellamy supports her suggestion by stating that if community councils had the 
powers to give directions to the administration it would create an untenable 
situation for the Mayor and the Administration. (p. 22) With that in mind she was 
sure to include as a recommendation that the public be allowed to make 
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anonymous complaints to the integrity commissioner (rec. # 41) To further 
support social accountability, Justice Bellamy recommended that the City through 
the Mayor should report to the public on an annual basis (rec. # 96) One of these 
annual report is the Auditors General’s report on the Fraud and Waste hotline.  It 
is hoped that through the provision of information such as this, the City is being 
transparent and accountable and the public in response can choose to question 
and initiate change where they see appropriate. Hazel McCallion, who is 
currently facing allegations of corruption and is the longest serving mayor of the 
City of Mississauga, one of Ontario largest municipality, states that “the sky is the 
limit with the involvement of the people.  Any decisions that politicians make, can 
be controlled. Believe or not.” (McCallion, 2010) 
In light of the troubling condition that was occurring over a number of 
years at the City of Toronto, which started before the amalgamation, the City 
ordered an investigation to assess the problem and it causes.  The necessary 
corrective actions were put in place, such as amending policies and after the 
recommendations were provided, changes were implemented.  It is unclear as to 
the level of success that was achieved by the City in implementing the 
recommendations, but a look at what happened during and after the inquiry 
should give us a good idea of whether enough is being done to eliminate 
corruption and maintain integrity within the municipality.   
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THE OUTCOME 
 
“…Attention continues until the distressing concern is alleviated.” (Pal, 
2003) 
 
The City of Toronto staff and officials had a good idea of the causes of the 
problems and had started the remedial process. Justice Bellamy was pleased 
that this was happening before she had completed the inquiry and presented her 
recommendations.   However, as the inquiry drew to a close, a disturbing 
situation unfolded.  Justice Bellamy gained knowledge of an invitation that 
offered drinks, dinner and entry to a professional sporting event in an executive 
suite at the Air Canada Centre that was sent to Toronto councillors all at the 
expense of an industry association. (pg. 410)  Receiving the invitation was not 
the only issue, but the fact that some councillors defended the association for 
sending the invitation and saw nothing wrong in attending the event raised 
questions as to whether anything had really changed.  Councillors were not 
seeing that they would be continuing the problems of: compromising their 
independence in the eyes of the public; sending a message to other organization 
that municipal officials and staff are still open to be influenced; using their public 
office to obtain private benefits and setting a bad example for all other municipal 
staff, when they should have been an ‘ethical compass’ in providing strong work 
ethics. (pp. 410-411) The inquiry was not complete and already there were 
strong indications that maybe the measures to address and eventually eliminate 
corrupt activities from municipal operations were either not enough or just not 
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getting through to officials and staff.  After the inquiry, Justice Bellamy reported 
that her task was now completed, and the City’s task of growth and renewal 
should continue, as the task is never done.  Her recommendations were made to 
facilitate the City and its residents to re-examine the City’s governance and work 
on continued improvements. (pp. 412-413)  In November of 2009, the ‘Integrity 
Commissioner of the City of Toronto organized a half-day conference with all the 
other Ontario municipalities to discuss and exchange ideas on how to improve 
the function of the integrity commissioner with the aim of providing more effective 
services to Council and the Community.’ (Basse, 2010) This was another 
indicator that government was working towards curbing corruption and 
maintaining integrity within municipalities.   But how can we justifiably determine 
if continued attention was given to address the issue with the objective to 
alleviate the problem?  This is where a credible database such as the Auditor 
General annual report would be of value. 
To help assess the effectiveness of the implemented preventative measures, 
I will examine statistical data over the period 2002 through to 2010 that was 
compiled by the City of Toronto’s Auditor General. (See Appendix 2)  Alongside 
the provision of the Municipal Conflicts of Interest Act, the Municipal Act and the 
appointment of the four accountability officers, the City implemented a Fraud and 
waste hotline in 2002.  In the 2010 annual Auditor General Report, a best 
practice carried out by the City of Toronto, indicated that “the anonymous 
reporting through the hotline is an effective means of detecting irregularities, as 
the tips or complaints received remains the most common means of detecting 
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fraud.” The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) a global 
professional organization also confirmed that “the hotline remains an effective 
fraud detection tool and encourages tips from employees who might otherwise 
not report misconduct.” (Griffiths, Jeff, 2010)  Over the years the data compiled 
illustrated that the complaints steadily increased with slight decreases in the two 
election years 2006 and 2010.   The steady increase could be as a result of more 
people feeling comfortable in making reports and / or the level of incidents wer 
actually increasing.  The Auditor General expressed that it was unclear and 
difficult to determine why the number of complaints fell by 15% in 2010 and that 
the reasons could be as a result of varied factors. Could the decrease be as a 
result of the effectiveness of the preventative measures that were implemented?  
It must be noted that the complaints and allegations reported did not embody the 
whole picture of corrupt activities at the City, but provided a good idea of what 
was going on in order to determine what needed to be done and most importantly 
that there were effective tools in place to help address alleged corrupt activities.   
Measuring the negative effects of corruption is important as it causes the 
municipality to see how much loss has been incurred and where it has occurred, 
making way for the creation and implementation of effective recovery and 
preventative measures. The far reaching effect of corruption can be seen in the 
increased management costs where management is reallocated to conduct 
investigations, reduced morale of staff leading to reduced productivity and a 
flawed reputation of the municipality such as was the case with the City of 
Toronto.   Measuring the costs can be difficult and not credible because the full 
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details of every corrupt activity will not necessarily be revealed.   The City of 
Toronto’s Auditor General Office has managed to capture data on Loss and 
Recovery in 2010 (See Appendix 3).  The data showed that of the complaints 
received and were substantiated; quantifiable actual losses to the City were 
$85,790.00, which is likely to increase as the 2010 complaints are concluded in 
2011. The recovered amounts totaled $2,267 and are also expected to increase 
as the complaints are concluded.  Most importantly is the ‘At Risk’ amount of 
$21,228.00. This represented potential loss to the City, had the incident of 
wrongdoing continued without being detected.  Having knowledge of the amounts 
that were at risk, is substantial proof that the preventative measure is being 
effective and is further enabling corrective actions to be taken. Despite the fact 
that these numbers appear insignificant, the truth of the matter is that the 
preventative measures implemented are working.  This kind of information is 
what is needed to help substantiate the ongoing need for an effective anti-
corruption program and also provides evidence as to why compiling data on 
corruption activities can be of great benefit to the prevention of corruption within 
municipalities.   Based on the data provided by the Auditor General’s office on 
alleged Fraud at the City of Toronto, it is evident that the distressing concern is 
not completely alleviated, because the reporting continues.  Justice Bellamy 
noted that “Eruptions of scandal involving public money show that our democratic 
system is not perfect, but much can be done to mitigate the imperfections and 
restore public trust”    (p. 8)   
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Despite the various laws, regulations and codes, corrupt activities and 
allegations of corrupt activities continue to be highlighted through the media and 
reported through the fraud hotline. The question resurfaces, ‘Is government doing 
enough through the preventative measures to meet the objective in curbing 
corruption and promoting integrity within local government?’  The answer is 
unfolding to an unquestionable ‘NO”.  It is simple not enough - It is not enough 
because as long as there are human interactions, humans will finds ways to get 
around the measures.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
It is believed that upon being hired or elected to serve within a 
municipality, all staff would rank integrity highly and uphold the virtues of 
honesty, fairness, truthfulness and reliability as they serve. Unfortunately, for 
varied reasons, and despite the intent and efforts of legislations, over time, there 
are staff members who fail to comply and get drawn into corrupt activities. That is 
to say, some politicians and executives at the local level, by virtue of their 
position, are able to exercise their influence and authority to control the key 
decision making process. This makes it clear that the ability to control decision 
making is closely tied into ‘power’.  It may be argued that elected officials do 
have political power, but when that power is used in the wrong way, that is when 
we have a problem.  Therefore, it is because of this ‘power’ that they possess, 
why municipalities must put in place policies and procedures that guides the 
decision making process, and to ensure that these principles are adhered to on a 
consistent basis, in the interest of accountability and transparency.  I maintain 
that the preventative measures currently in place are not enough to complete the 
job of preventing and eliminating corruption and maintaining integrity within 
municipalities.  Because the human component plays a large role in municipal 
operations and because of the inadequate preventative measures, we continue 
to read and hear about allegations and incidents of corruption within 
municipalities through the various media. 
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Municipal staff, the general public, the police and the private sector can 
make a difference in the level of corruption within municipalities.  What is needed 
is a clear understanding of the nature of corruption that takes place within 
government and together they can work to curb its continuation.  It must also be 
understood that the corruption prevention issue cannot be left to the municipal 
leaders alone. Pressure and collaboration from the staff, public, police and the 
business community can and will keep the commitment of corruption prevention 
alive. To be able to achieve this, citizens must be educated and informed about 
the role they can play in fighting corruption within municipalities.  They need to 
understand that on-going corruption lowers their standard of living and that they 
need to take a more active role in disclosing or reporting corrupt activities, by 
monitoring or reviewing municipal government performance.   
 Legislators, municipal staff and residents alike are aware that, although 
they are not directly involved in the corrupt activities that take place within 
municipalities, they know that it will somehow have a negative effect on them.   If 
these incidents within municipal operations are allowed to continue, the integrity 
status of the municipality and the competence of its staff is likely to be 
questioned. The onlookers may not necessarily say that one or two municipal 
staff members are being corrupt; they will say all city staffs and officials are 
corrupt. This would reflect negatively on the HRM functions, the hired staff and 
elected officials therein, which could lead to distrust between municipal staff 
which could further lead to reduced performance and efficiency in service 
delivery.   If the situation progresses to such a level, we can anticipate that the 
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associated financial and economic problems will follow closely behind.  It is the 
government’s responsibility to address the issue of corruption by empowering 
both the public and staff (by getting them more involved in the decision making) 
to see how best corrupt activities within municipalities can be discouraged. So 
what should be government’s additional approach to addressing corruption within 
municipalities?  
Mr. Pino Arlacchi at a global program against corruption conference pointed 
out in his presentation that there are four positions in which actions can be taken 
against corruption. (Arlacchi, 1999)  I will only introduce two of the positions as it 
relates to corruption prevention in Ontario. 
 “Firstly, government needs to put in place a solid set of preventative tools, 
such as codes of conduct and strong independent bodies that can help ensure 
that the standards of behaviours are respected.” 
For codes of conduct and ethics to be at its best or most effective, it must be 
developed in an organization that accepts and embraces its presence.  The 
relevant authorities should bear in mind that these codes must be created, taking 
into consideration the culture of the municipality.  Communicating the details of 
the code creation is also important so that staff are aware of why the codes are 
being developed; understand the code itself, that is, what is expected and what is 
not acceptable and the consequences if the codes are breached.  This should 
result in a more positive response from staff and for the codes to be more 
effective in what it is trying to achieve.  While it is arguable that codes do not 
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necessarily work because they are unrealistic in their goals and give the 
impression of being controlling, they can be most effective when created for the 
administration and delivery of public services and when they are accompanied or 
supported by legislation. 
“Secondly, the public and staff alike need to be educated on the advantages 
of good governance and participate in promoting it.  The public must share the 
responsibility in demanding honesty and integrity from their local government and 
know that integrity is good and corruption is bad.” 
Professor Ashour of Alexandria University, Egypt, in his report on Integrity, 
Transparency and Accountability in Public Sector Human Resources 
Management, stated that once the HRM functions are effectively implemented it 
will be easier to reinforce ethical and integrity principles (value-based) by 
influencing or reshaping the corporate culture.  The value based system coupled 
with legislation (rule-based) would work to promote professionalism, efficiency, 
integrity and fairness within local government, which in turn will overtime reduce 
and discouraged wrongdoing, conflicts of interest and corruption.  Integrity and 
ethical behavior has to be established within municipal staff at the time of hire 
because the municipality’s success will depend on the integrity of the municipal 
staff.  ‘It must be consistent in all municipal staff, it has to be a personal 
commitment by all staff, it has to be fully endorsed by management, there has to 
be a zero tolerance policy to assist in reducing the temptation to get involved in 
corrupt activities and admonition, where all staff found guilty of being involved in 
corrupt activity is appropriately dealt with as the legislation or regulations direct.’ 
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(Obura, 2008)   It is then evident that HRM can play an integral role in the 
prevention and reduction of wrongdoing, conflicts of interest and corruption 
allegations and at the same time uphold integrity within municipalities.   
Social accountability from municipalities (the supply side) is achieved through 
the processes and procedures, regulations & codes of conduct in place, annual 
financial audits and through the directives of the upper levels of government.  
Social accountability is achieved through the involvement of the public (the 
demand side) when local government encourages their participation in budget 
making, include them in evaluating service delivery, providing education on their 
legal rights and about the services they are entitled to and facilitate the 
involvement of the citizens advisory board or community councils.  “Municipalities 
are increasingly understood to be not just service providers but democratic 
governments.  This reconceptualization highlights the imperative of operating in a 
democratic, accountable and transparent manner and brings with it expectations 
that governments engage citizens and communities in meaningful ways in the 
policy process.” (Good, 2009)   
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
We are aware that rule based preventative measures such as laws, codes 
of conduct and policies are in place to address corruption and maintain integrity 
within Ontario municipalities.  It is also recognized that they alone are not enough 
to achieve the task.  Best practices that are successful used by municipalities 
such as the Fraud hotline used by the City of Toronto should be shared and its 
use encouraged by other municipalities.  But what else can be acted upon by 
government to address and eventually eliminate corruption and maintain integrity 
within Ontario municipalities?  
An “Anti-corruption strategy must be articulated by leaders in the political, 
economic and civil society; it must engage all sectors…” (Ongwenyi, 2008) This 
strategic program objective is to empower staff and public alike through 
knowledge which will in turn compel government to be more accountable and 
transparent in the delivering of services and administering the daily municipal 
operations.  This program facilitates the building of awareness of both the 
municipal staffs and the public, the prevention of the corrupt activities by staff, 
the prosecution of the corrupt municipal staff and rewarding the loyal public 
servant. Empowerment of the public and staff through the program along with the 
rule of law together makes a great preventative tool in curbing corruption at the 
municipal level. 
It is without question that local government and government in general needs 
to be reformed as it relates to HRM role. It is confirmed that not only can HRM 
P a g e  | 52 
 
play a direct and effective role, but it should play an integral role in the prevention 
and reduction of wrongdoing, conflicts of interest and corruption allegations and 
at the same time uphold integrity within municipalities.  Since it is evident that the 
amount of these incidents are more likely to occur once the human factor is 
involved, the more reasons why HRM should be incorporated to reinforce 
integrity, transparency and accountability, with the intention to eventually 
eliminate corrupt activities.   It must be recognized that if the integrity of the 
individual is not solidified, once the opportunity presents itself through a weak 
system or receiving of authority or influence, the individual is more likely to get 
involved.  If the individual knows what is expected of him/her, they will more than 
likely do the right thing.  
Rick Brick established that Human Resource Management is more than 
“hiring” and “firing.” He believes organizations should find a way to integrate all 
aspects of HR within their operational plans and one that is has the full support of 
its executive, leaders, staff members and unions.    In short, Brick asserts that 
HRM is a key strategic component of any organization including the public sector 
and can bring high value through innovative programs by working closely with the 
organization leadership to advance its goals. (Brick, 2011) In this case, the goal 
is to eventually eliminate corrupt activities and maintain integrity within 
municipalities. 
Prof. Ahmed Ashour proposed a framework for strengthening integrity, 
transparency and accountability through HRM. (ASHOUR, 2004)  He suggested 
‘To prevent corruption, is to ensure that ethical practices are carried out by HR 
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specialist and line managers, to be able to achieve a high level of integrity in the 
decision making process.  He also suggested that support be provided to the 
municipality ethics reform, through policies and practices that aim at influencing 
human performance and conduct in local government.’  He goes on to say that, 
‘morale, commitment, loyalty, motivation and competence are dimensions that 
impacts ethics and integrity, which are the results of HR policies and practices.  
The Municipal Performance Measurement Program (MPMP) with its reliable 
and credible measurement and reporting system that provides high-level 
information should use its position and resources to create a database of all 
incidents of corruption within Ontario municipalities. The information from all the 
municipalities should include dates, type of incident or allegations, identify 
whether the individual involved is an employee or elected official, how the 
incident was made public, identifying the weakness in the system that 
encouraged its occurrence and how the incident or allegation was resolved.  The 
data collected on municipal corruption should include measurements wherein the 
perceived increase could be validated and used in a creative and constructive 
way to increase awareness on the issue and highlight best practices to 
discourage and prevent future corruption:  All in an attempt to facilitate 
accountability, transparency and integrity to further enhance the performance of 
Ontario municipalities. 
In closing, Justice Bellamy stated that “If those lessons are learned by people 
in government, and by people dealing with government, we can hope to see 
scandals (corrupt activities) arising from spending public money far less 
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frequently.”  (p. 24)  Therefore, let municipalities learn the lessons and adopt the 
best practices so that it can be confidently said that government is doing enough 
to address and eliminate corruption and preserve integrity within Ontario 
municipalities.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Figure # 1 
Primary Motivation of Serious Fraud Offenders 
 
 
Source: AIC / PricewaterhouseCoopers (2003) 
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Figure # 2 
Complaints reported at the City of Toronto 2002 to 2010 
 
 
 
Source: City of Toronto’s 2010 Annual Report – Fraud and Waste Hotline 
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Figure # 3 
Loss and Recovery in 2010 – The City of Toronto 
 
 
 
Source: City of Toronto’s 2010 Annual Report – Fraud and Waste Hotline 
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